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Abstract—Due to limited computational and memory re-
sources, current deep learning models accept only rather small
images in input, calling for preliminary image resizing. This is not
a problem for high-level vision problems, where discriminative
features are barely affected by resizing. On the contrary, in
image forensics, resizing tends to destroy precious high-frequency
details, impacting heavily on performance. One can avoid resizing
by means of patch-wise processing, at the cost of renouncing
whole-image analysis.
In this work, we propose a CNN-based image forgery detec-
tion framework which makes decisions based on full-resolution
information gathered from the whole image. Thanks to gradi-
ent checkpointing, the framework is trainable end-to-end with
limited memory resources and weak (image-level) supervision,
allowing for the joint optimization of all parameters. Experiments
on widespread image forensics datasets prove the good perfor-
mance of the proposed approach, which largely outperforms all
baselines and all reference methods.
Index Terms—Digital image forensics, CNN, forgery detection.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this work, we propose a new framework for image forgery
detection based on convolutional neural networks (CNN).
This may not look particularly exciting: deep learning is by-
now common practice to solve all kinds of vision-related
problems. However, image forensics has some peculiarities
that set it apart from standard computer vision problems. We
can summarize them in the need to look, at the same time,
at the whole image but also at its tiniest details. Consider the
example of Fig.1. This well-crafted splicing does not show
obvious artifacts that allow detection by visual inspection,
but a suitable structural analysis reveals differences that may
be due only to the insertion of alien material in the host
image. Indeed, many state-of-the-art forensic tools rely on
the statistical analysis of local micro-patterns. However, local
analyses alone are necessarily suboptimal. Clues emerging
from the whole image, and at multiple scales, should be
combined and processed jointly to make a reliable decision.
Therefore, our goal is to design CNN-based forensic tools that,
overcoming current technological limitations, meet the con-
trasting requirements of full-resolution and full-image training
and analysis.
It should be realized that this problem is indeed peculiar
of multimedia forensics. Typical CNN classifiers for com-
puter vision problems rely on macroscopic features, which
bear high-level semantic clues on the scene. For example,
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Fig. 1. Example of carefully crafted splicing. Visual inspection does not allow
detection, but pixel-level analyses expose suspicious textural differences.
a face detector may look for the presence of specific facial
features with suitable spatial relationships. Such large-scale
information persists nicely after resizing the image. And in
fact, target images of wildly different sizes are routinely
resized to match the input CNN layer. Actually, resizing is
even used on purpose, during training, to gain robustness
to scale changes. In the context of image forensics, instead,
resizing may destroy the very same information classifiers rely
upon, the pixel-level micro-patterns that characterize different
digital histories. By analyzing such patterns one can identify
camera models, individual devices, or discover the traces of
out-camera processing. A huge scientific literature testifies on
the importance of such high-frequency features. Hence, image
resizing and resampling should be definitely avoided when
performing forensic tasks.
So, one could naively think of using a network with an input
size as large as the target image. Besides the lack of generality
(images can be of any size) a more fundamental issue concerns
computational and memory resources. Acquisition devices
are continuously improving their resolution, with commercial
smart-phone cameras delivering photos with many millions of
pixels. Deep learning hardware capabilities do not increase
at the same rate. Due to computation and memory limitations,
state-of-the-art architectures accept only small images in input,
especially when very deep networks are used. Therefore, the
highly informative image samples cannot be directly fed to a
network and analyzed as a whole.
Eventually, when high-resolution must be preserved, a
simple solution is to perform patch-wise feature extraction,
followed by some forms of feature aggregation to exploit
the full-image information. This approach makes full sense,
and largely predates deep learning. Yet, even with good
CNN-based feature extractors and classifiers, it is inherently
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2suboptimal for several reasons: i) poor feature extraction; ii)
poor global decision; iii) need of over-detailed ground truth.
First of all, since the patch-wise feature extractor is trained
without taking into account whole-image information, the best
it can do is to learn good features for local decisions, which
are not necessarily the best ones in view of future aggregation.
Then, the global classifier, trained after freezing the patch-level
processing, operates only on intermediate features, hence is
necessarily suboptimal with respect to a classifier trained end-
to-end on the original data. Last, patch-wise training requires
a detailed, handcrafted, ground truth. Therefore, the large
datasets necessary to train deep learning models require a huge
man-power and are inevitably affected by errors, with a sure
impact on the eventual performance.
All these considerations motivate our work, and allow us
to define the final goal more clearly. We want to design deep
learning models for image forgery detection which are:
1) full-image: make decisions based on information gath-
ered from all over the image;
2) full-resolution: do not perform any harmful image resiz-
ing;
3) end-to-end trainable: optimize jointly all model parame-
ters for image-level classification, based only on image-
level (weak) supervision.
To achieve this goal, we propose a framework comprising
three blocks in cascade performing, respectively, patch-wise
feature extraction, image-wise feature aggregation, and global
decision. All blocks are fully trainable, based on image-
wise labels, allowing information to flow backward through
the whole network. The global decision takes into account
features extracted from the whole image, whatever its size, and
based on local micro-patterns. Memory problems are solved by
means of gradient checkpointing, with a very limited increase
of computational costs.
With these solutions, the proposes framework allows one
to optimize jointly the local information extraction, the global
feature aggregation, and the whole-image classification, what-
ever the input image size. We implemented several versions of
this general framework, through appropriate selection of the
major architectural blocks. After training on suitable synthetic
datasets, we performed extensive experiments on realistic
datasets widespread in the image forensics community, focus-
ing on local manipulations, such as splicings, copy-moves, and
inpainting, likely indicators of malicious attacks. Results fully
support our approach which largely outperforms both baseline
methods and state-of-the-art references, including methods
requiring strong supervision.
In the following, we analyze related work (Section II),
describe the proposed approach (Section III), report on the
results of numerical experiments (Section IV), and finally draw
conclusions (Section V).
II. RELATED WORK
Forgery detection is a central topic in image forensics, and
there is a large bulk of relevant literature. In addition, it is
necessary to consider both forgery detection and localization,
since these tasks are tightly related. Indeed, detection methods
can be used for localization through sliding-window analysis,
and localization method may allow detection by suitable post-
processing. So, to limit the scope, in the following analysis
we take a historical perspective, but focus especially on recent
CNN-based methods. Moreover, we neglect global manipula-
tions, such as histogram equalization or gamma correction, as
they can be hardly regarded as malicious forgeries.
Early contributions were mostly model-based, looking for
statistical anomalies related to the color filter array (CFA) [1],
[2], double JPEG compression [3], [4], or sensor noise [5],
[6]. Most of these methods assume a priori the presence of a
forgery and pursue localization through pixel-level analysis,
generating a heat-map. Then, a global score can be easily
computed from the latter and used for detection. Model-based
approaches are elegant and do not require extensive training,
but work only in quite restrictive hypotheses.
The advent of data-driven solutions granted a quantum leap
in performance and ensured higher generality. Methods based
on machine learning extract suitable hand-crafted features
from the image, both in the spatial domain [7], [8], [9], [10],
[11] and in the transform (DCT, wavelet) domain [12], [13],
[14], which are used to train a classifier. Extracting features
from the whole image allows direct and reliable image forgery
detection. Instead, localization can be obtained by working in
sliding-window modality and using a suitable local score. The
most discriminative features rely on high-order image statistics
which help revealing spatial inconsistencies originated by the
presence of forgeries. To this end, high-pass residual images
are often used, obtained by means of derivative filters [15] or
image denoisers.
In recent years, methods based on deep learning have
become dominant. Some early papers, inspired by the success
of residual-based machine learning methods, propose CNN
architectures with a first layer of high-pass filters, either
fixed [16], [17], or trainable [18], meant to extract residual
feature maps. In [19] it is even shown that successful methods
based on hand-crafted features can be recast as CNNs and
fine tuned for improved performance. In [20] these low-level
features are augmented with high-level ones in a two-stream
CNN architecture. Recent findings [21], [22], however, show
that such constrained first layer is only useful with small
networks and datasets. Given a suitably large training set,
general-purpose very deep architectures provide the same good
results in favourable cases, but ensure higher robustness to
compression and training/test misalignments.
Several papers, to begin with [16], followed more recently
by [23] and [24], train explicitly the net to distinguish between
homogeneous and heterogeneous patches, the latter character-
ized by the presence of both pristine and forged areas. The
rationale is to catch the patterns that characterize transitions
regions, anomalous with respect to the background, so as to
localize possible forgeries. This idea is followed also in [25],
where an hybrid CNN-LSTM architecture is trained end-to-
end to produce a binary mask for forgery localization. These
methods, however, require detailed ground truth maps to train
the net, which may not be available or precise.
For architectural constraints, most of these methods carry
out a patch-based analysis, working on relatively small
3Fig. 2. Strong image resizing corrupts the textural patterns used in forensics.
patches, with further steps needed to compute a global score
at image-level. In [16], for example, the CNN extract features
patch-wise and later aggregates them in a global feature vector
used to feed a SVM classifier. This may impact on detection
performance. A more fundamental limit concerns the need of
strongly aligned training and test sets. Some methods, e.g.,
[24], [25], carry out experiments on a single database split
into training and test, others [20] require fine-tuning on target
data. All this highlights the limited generalization ability of
supervised learning, as also shown in [26].
A more promising line of research is to revisit the anomaly
detection approach under a data-driven paradigm. Anomalies
are detected by means of single-image analyses, with a sort of
blind source identification. In [27] this was accomplished in a
fully unsupervised fashion by using an autoencoder architec-
ture. More recent proposals [28], [29], [30] use camera-model
features, gathered off-line by dedicated CNNs, or leverage
metadata information [31] for direct detection. A strong pro
of this approach is that training is performed only on pristine
images, with no need of aligned datasets and ground truths,
which ensures good robustness and adaptability to unseen
manipulations. In [29] and [31], in particular, this is achieved
by using a Siamese training on pairs of patches extracted from
pristine images, with a suitable consistency metric.
Besides its technical content, this short review of ideas
makes clear that there is high and growing interest for new
solutions in this field, to face the threats posed by increasingly
sophisticated fake multimedia tools.
III. PROPOSED METHOD
Our aim is to design a deep network to detect the presence
of localized forgeries in a target image, irrespective of the
image size and the forgery size. Of course, images can have
wildly different sizes, depending also on the context, but
the trend is towards higher and higher resolutions. Today’s
smartphones feature cameras with resolutions of 10 Mpixels
and more. On the other hand, due to computation/memory
bottlenecks, deep networks accept rather small images in input,
for example 256×256-pixel. Hence, a strong size mismatch
typically occurs between target image and network input. For
most image analysis applications, this mismatch is not a big
problem and two solutions can be considered:
1) images are rescaled to fit the network input, or
2) images are processed patch-wise, and results are fused
off-line to make a global decision.
In the following paragraphs, we first explain why such so-
lutions are not viable for image forgery detection, then de-
scribe the proposed architecture, and finally show how it can
be trained end-to-end based on the gradient checkpointing
method.
A. The need for full-image full-resolution processing
The first solution listed before is to rescale the image to fit
the network first layer. However, this is not advisable when
dealing with forgery detection. In some cases, the forged re-
gion could be so small to become practically undetectable after
strong downsampling. A more fundamental problem, however,
is that some sophisticated forgeries may only be detected based
on the statistical analyses of micro-textures. However, these
precious high-frequency components are strongly corrupted
when the image is resized or resampled. Fig.2 shows a clear
example, in which the markedly different textures highlighted
in Fig.1, after resizing become very similar to one another and
basically useless for forensic analyses.
The second solution is to perform patch-level detection,
with no resampling, followed by some form of information
fusion to make a global decision. Indeed, given an ideal patch-
level classifier, the fusion problem has an obvious solution,
and the presence of a forgery can be declared if at least one
forged patch is detected. However, real-world detectors are far
from ideal, they always have non-zero missing-detection and
false-alarm rates. For example, assuming a rather optimistic
1% patch-level false-alarm rate, and independent decisions,
a 100-patch pristine image would present a false-alarm rate
beyond 63%. Therefore, the fusion problem is not at all trivial
with real-world detectors, as our experiments will confirm.
In addition, the patch-level detector itself should be designed
taking into account image-level performance.
These considerations motivate the need for a full-image full-
resolution detector. In this way, precious microtextures can be
preserved and, at the same time, information coming from all
patches can be processed jointly to make a reliable decision.
A naive implementation of this idea, with a CNN input size
matching the image size, would require huge computational
and memory resources, not to speak of the number of images
needed for reliable training. Instead, we propose a suitable
architecture that, through reasonable structural constraints, sat-
isfies the needs of forensics detection with limited resources.
B. Proposed architecture
The proposed framework is represented pictorially in Fig.3.
It consists of three blocks performing, respectively, patch-level
feature extraction, feature aggregation, and decision. Note that,
although we propose a specific implementation of such blocks,
this is not the core of our proposal, which is instead the whole
framework.
1) Patch-level feature extraction: after dividing the image
in overlapping patches, these are processed to extract discrim-
inative features. As feature extractors, we adopt some state-
of-the-art deep networks, taking the output of the penultimate
layer as feature vector, and discarding the final class probabil-
ities. However, considering the peculiarities of image forgery
detection, we modify the input layer to accommodate some
additional inputs, the image noiseprint [30], besides the image
color bands. Noiseprints are high-pass image residuals, ex-
tracted through a dedicated network, in which camera-related
artifacts are emphasized. Therefore, they highlight possible
spatial anomalies and may help detecting local manipulations.
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Fig. 3. Proposed end-to-end trainable framework for image forgery detection, comprising extraction, aggregation, and classification blocks.
2) Feature aggregation: the feature extractor produces a
large number of features, which are aggregated image-wise
to obtain a single descriptor for the classification task. To
this end, we consider several forms of pooling, maximum,
minimum, average, and average of squares:
Fmax = max
i=1,..,Np
Fi
Fmin = min
i=1,..,Np
Fi
Fmean =
1
Np
∑Np
i=1 Fi
Fmsq =
1
Np
∑Np
i=1 F
2
i
(1)
where Fi = [Fi,1, . . . , Fi,C ] is the C-component feature ex-
tracted from the i-th patch, Np is the number of (possibly over-
lapping) patches, and all operations on features are component-
wise. The most appropriate type of pooling depends on the
problem of interest. When the information is spread over the
whole image, an average pooling is reasonable, while min
or max pooling are more appropriate when the discriminative
information is concentrated in a localized region. In any case,
we also use the combination of multiple types of pooling,
leaving the final choice to experiments. After aggregation all
explicit spatial dependencies are discarded.
Note that the type of pooling impacts on how information
back-propagates from the output to update the parameters
of the feature extractor. In more detail, let Fagg denote the
aggregated feature, L the loss function of the framework, and
θ a generic parameter of the CNN. Then, the gradient of L
with respect to θ reads
∂L
∂θ
=
C∑
c=1
∂L
∂Fagg,c
∂Fagg,c
∂θ
(2)
with
∂Fagg,c
∂θ
=

∂Fi,c
∂θ
· δi,imax(c) max pooling
∂Fi,c
∂θ
· δi,imin(c) min pooling
1
Np
Np∑
i=1
∂Fi,c
∂θ
average pooling
1
Np
Np∑
i=1
2Fi,c
∂Fi,c
∂θ
av.square pooling
(3)
In the above equation, δi,j equals 1 when i=j and 0 otherwise,
while imax(c) and imin(c) point to the feature vectors with the
largest, respectively smallest, c-th component. Therefore, with
max or min pooling, only some “active” patches contribute
to the gradient, and are updated during training. Instead, with
mean and msq pooling all patches are involved. Of course,
when multiple forms of pooling are used at the same time,
the gradient is obtained as the weighted sum of the individual
terms.
3) Decision: after aggregating the local information in a
single descriptor F for the whole image, this is classified by
means of a few fully-connected layers. This is the typical
classifier used in deep networks, and usually two layers
provide a good trade-off between complexity and accuracy.
C. End-to-end training
If we focus only on the post-training operations, the pro-
posed architecture does not look much different from conven-
tional approaches based on patch-wise feature extraction, pool-
ing, and classification. Contrary to such approaches, however,
our framework is trainable end-to-end. This means that we do
not train the feature extractor on individual labeled patches
and, afterwards, train the classifier on the features extracted
by a fixed net. Instead, we train the whole framework, top
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Fig. 4. Conventional CNN training with backpropagation.
to bottom, on full-size images, with a single label associated
with each one: forged or pristine. The loss back-propagates
through the net up to to individual patches, allowing the feature
extractor to learn which information is the most discriminative
for the final decision, and adapting the classifier jointly with
the extractor itself.
To better underline the difference with respect to patch-wise
training, consider that in a large image with a localized forgery
most patches are actually pristine, and only a few ones truly
forged. In our end-to-end training, all these patches share the
same image-level label (forged). Therefore, the net is forced
to learn how to manage such contrasting indications to make
the correct decision. As a side benefit, there is no need to have
a pixel-wise ground truth for training, since the only relevant
label applies to the whole image. Also, images of any size can
be used for training, with forgeries of any size (especially if
max/min pooling is used).
Going into technical details for each training batch of
images, the framework performs i) an inner loop on the patches
of each image, computing the back-propagation at the end of
the loop, and ii) an outer loop on the images of the batch, that
sums up gradients computed for each inner loop and finally
updates the weights once at the end of the batch. Due to
the arbitrary size of input images, each inner loop involves a
different number of patches, impacting on the computational
effort, which may vary significantly from batch to batch. This
is a minor issue, though, with respect to memory requirements.
In fact, to back-propagate the loss, gradients must be computed
for all processed patches, causing an increase of the occupied
memory, which grows linearly with the image size. For deep
networks and large images, this memory is simply unavailable.
The situation is described pictorially in Fig.4, where a circle
represents a layer, and a black dot at the center indicates that
activations are stored. In the forward pass (a), in fact, all
activations at each layer are computed and stored. Then, in the
backward pass (b), they are used to propagate gradients from
the last layer, where the loss is computed, to the input. After
usage, they are erased (small dots). It should be realized that
deep nets can include hundreds of layers, with several feature
maps at each layer, whose size is typically proportional to the
input size. Therefore, to process a large input image at once,
a huge number of variables should be stored, exceeding the
available memory.
To manage this problem we resort to the gradient check-
pointing strategy, originally proposed in [32], which trades off
memory for computation. This solution is described pictorially
in Fig.5. During the forward pass (a), all activations are deleted
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Fig. 5. CNN training with gradient checkpoints. After the forward pass (a),
activations are stored only at checkpoint layers (red). The backward pass (b)-
(e) proceeds one group of layers at a time. Activations at intermediate layers
must be recomputed each time a group is processed.
immediately after use, except for those in a few “checkpoint”
layers (red dots). In the backward pass (b)-(e), gradients are
computed one group at a time (in the figure we show two
groups of 4 layers). Since activations are necessary to this end,
they are recomputed, but only from the last checkpoint on, (b).
This allows backpropagating the gradient until the checkpoint
layer itself (c). At this point all variables at layers beyond the
checkpoint are deleted, and the process goes on with a new
group of layers (d)-(e).
With a judicious choice of the number of checkpoints,
memory occupation can be significantly reduced and become
manageable. Of course, each activation is computed twice, but
the computational overhead is limited, because the forward
pass is lighter than the backward pass. Note that gradient
checkpointing has been recently made available in PyTorch
as well as in other platforms. With this solution, we were able
to train our network end-to-end seamlessly, with a increase of
the training time that never exceeded 20%.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
In this Section we design and perform numerical experi-
ments to assess the performance of the proposed approach.
In the following subsections, we first describe the training
procedure, then present the results of some preliminary ex-
periments carried out to make key design choices, and finally
compare the proposed method with both baselines and state-of-
the-art references on several challenging datasets widespread
in the community.
A. Training
In order to train our networks, we generated a suitable
synthetic dataset. Background images are taken from the
6TABLE I
FEATURES OF DATASETS USED FOR TRAINING AND TESTING
dataset manipulations counter forensic # prist. / forged resolution format
Vision / UCID automatic splicing - 7565 / ∞ 960×720 − 4640×3480 JPG
Dresden / FAU automatic splicing - 4992 / 14976 2560×1920 − 4352×3264 JPG
DSO-1 splicing color/contrast adjustment 100 / 100 2048×1536 PNG
Korus splicing, copy-move - 220 / 220 1920×1080 TIF
splicing, copy-move, color/contrast adjustment, PRNU editing, PNG, BMP
NC2017 computer-generated, JPEG quantization, cloning 2470 / 1051 436×600 − 3648×5472 JPG
inpainting
splicing, copy-move, color/contrast adjustment, PRNU editing, PNG, BMP
MFC2018 computer-generated, JPEG quantization, cloning, noising, 12246 / 1935 352×512 − 5470×7586 JPG, TIF
inpainting dithering, social network laundering
Vision dataset, proposed originally [33] for camera model
identification, which comprises 7565 images acquired by 35
different devices with the native high-quality JPEG compres-
sion. To generate manipulated images, we spliced on them
objects drawn from a set of 81 objects manually cropped from
the uncompressed images of the UCID dataset [34]. Details
on all datasets used in this work are reported in Tab.I.
We used all images from 25 devices of the Vision dataset
for training, and kept the others for validation, with an
approximate 70%-30% split, so as to avoid any possible bias.
For each pristine image, we created on the fly a manipulated
image by inserting in a random position one of the UCID
objects, selected at random, with random scaling and rotation.
Scaling is such that the size of spliced objects goes from
about 1% to about 10% of the image size. Eventually, both
pristine and manipulated images are flipped or rotated, and
JPEG compressed with QF going from 75 to 100, obtaining
a significant augmentation. Fig.6 shows a few examples of
manipulated Vision/UCID images (without rotations).
In the training procedure we used the Adam optimizer with
minibatches of 10+10 images and a learning rate of 0.001.
Training took about three days with an Nvidia Tesla P100
GPU. With the same hardware, testing takes about half a
second for a 3072×4096-pixel image, including the noiseprint
extraction, which decreases to 0.01 seconds if the image tiles
are already stored in the GPU memory.
B. Preliminary experiments
The proposed framework aims at the detection of localized
manipulations, such as splicing, copy-move, and object re-
moval through content-aware inpainting. Towards this goal,
we instantiated the proposed framework by means of some
key design choices. In particular, we
• augmented input RGB bands with the corresponding
noiseprint bands;
• used Xception [35] as feature extractor;
• performed aggregation by including all types of pooling;
• used two fully connected layers, of size FC1=512 and
FC2=256, to perform the final classification.
We arrived at these choices as a result of a large number
of preliminary experiments, whose description would be dis-
persive and tedious. However, we can study experimentally
Fig. 6. Examples from the synthetic Vision/UCID training set. Spliced objects
are delimited by a red contour for the sake of clarity.
the impact of each individual choice on the performance of
the proposed architecture. To this end, we generated a new
dataset, with the same modalities used for the training set, but
completely separated from it. Background images were taken
from the Dresden dataset, originally proposed [36] for camera
model identification, and manipulated images were created by
splicing on them 13 objects taken from the FAU dataset [37]
(see again Tab.I for details on datasets). After performing the
splicing, images were JPEG compressed at high (QF≥95),
medium (90≥QF≥85), or low quality (80≥QF≥75), and even-
tually resized at scale=0.75 or left unchanged. Spliced objects
can be classified as large, medium, or small, depending on the
largest dimension of their bounding box (after image resizing),
set to 1024, 384, or 128, respectively. Note that, to carry out
the large number of tests required by this analysis, we use a
small training set, here, and results indicate main trends but
can be improved by a more accurate training.
To assess performance, here and in all subsequent experi-
ments, we classify the whole test set, compute false positive
rate (FPR) and true positive rate (TPR) as a function of
the detection threshold, going from 0 to 1, and obtain the
corresponding receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve.
Eventually, we compute the area under the ROC curve (AUC)
as a synthetic measure of performance.
7TABLE II
RESULTS OF ABLATION STUDIES ON THE DRESDEN/FAU DATASET
architecture AUC
RGB+NP / Xception / all poolings / 512 0.851
RGB → RGB+NP 0.845
NP → RGB+NP 0.849
Resnet101 → Xception 0.750
Inception → Xception 0.745
max-pooling → all poolings 0.800
avg-pooling → all poolings 0.808
FC1-size 256 → 512 0.831
FC1-size 1024 → 512 0.838
TABLE III
RESULTS ON SUBSETS FROM THE DRESDEN/FAU DATASET
sub-dataset AUC
global 0.851
large-size objects 0.855
medium-size objects 0.860
small-size objects 0.875
high-QF JPEG compression 0.886
medium-QF JPEG compression 0.847
low-QF JPEG compression 0.855
original-size 0.884
resized 0.841
In Tab.II we report the results of our ablation study. Row
2 refers to the selected architecture, which uses Xception,
takes in input both RGB and noiseprint bands, concatenates
vectors given by all pooling types, and use a size-512 FC1
layer. In all other rows, we modified a single item of this
reference architecture. A number of non-trivial results appear.
First of all, Xception is a much better feature extractor than
the two alternatives, Resnet101 [38] and InceptionV4 [39].
We had already observed a similar edge in other applications
[22] although never so sharp. The likely reason is Xception’s
better use of resources, with a much smaller number of
parameters to optimize for a given network depth. It also
clearly emerges that using 4 types of pooling together ensures
a significant improvement w.r.t. using only one of them. Using
only max-pooling, as suggested by the nature of the problem,
is even worse than using average pooling, probably because
of its lower robustness to noise. As for the size of the first
FC layer, 512 appears to be the best choice, although just
slightly. The only controversial choice concerns the input. In
fact, using only the RGB bands or only the noiseprint (NP)
bands provides results very close to those of RGB+NP, with a
statistically insignificant gap. Therefore, we refrain from sharp
decisions on the input, and will keep testing several options
in real-world cases.
We now study the impact of compression, resizing, and
splicing size on the performance of the proposed method
by collecting results for specific relevant subsets. A quick
look at the numbers of Tab.III makes clear that only minor
variations occur across such subsets, with all AUC’s in the
0.84–0.89 range. The largest performance gap is observed
between original-size and resized images. Also JPEG com-
pression affects somewhat the detection performance, although
no significant difference emerges between the medium-QF and
low-QF cases. The size of the spliced area, instead, seems to
have a minor impact and, contrary to expectation, relatively
small-size splicings are detected more easily that large-size
ones. Note that, on the average, the AUC on specific subsets
is larger than the global AUC, but this is a consequence of the
higher homogeneity of the tested images.
C. Comparative performance analysis
Having justified our design choices, we now move to
compare the performance of the proposed framework with
those of suitable baselines and state-of-the-art methods, using
not only our relatively simple Dresden/FAU synthetic dataset,
but also several realistic and challenging datasets widespread
in the forensic community.
1) Reference methods: first of all, we consider two natural
baselines, both relying on Xception, given its good perfor-
mance. The first one, Xception-resize, consists simply in resiz-
ing the target image to fit the CNN input, with straightforward
training procedure. Xception-patchwise, instead, works by
analyzing the image patch-by-patch, with no resizing and some
spatial overlapping, and finally fusing results. Accordingly, the
net is trained to perform binary patch classification. Since
the detector will look for anomalies, we decided to label
only boundary patches as forged, that is, patches including a
significant fraction of both background and manipulated areas.
Eventually, the output probabilities are collected in a heatmap,
from which a suitable statistic is extracted (after some tests,
we chose the max statistic) and compared with a threshold to
make the image-level decision.
Just like our two baselines, methods proposed in the lit-
erature can be grouped in two classes. A few ones work at
image level, while the majority work at patch-level, as they
pursue forgery localization, and are converted into image-level
detectors through some simple post-processing.
For the first category, we selected the SPAM+SVM method
[8], winner of the First IEEE Forensic Challenge and based on
the SPAM steganalytic features [15], the CNN+SVM method
of [16], which extract features through a constrained CNN, and
LSTM-EnDec1 [25], which uses a long-short term memory
recurrent neural network to detect pristine/forged spatial tran-
sitions. For the second category, we consider several forgery
localization methods converted into image-level detectors. In
particular, we selected the best performing methods resulting
from the analysis carried out in [29], that is, CFA [2], which
exploits features related to the color-filter array, DCT [3],
based on the analysis of double-quantized DCT coefficients,
NOI [1], looking for spatial inconsistencies in the noise level,
EXIF-SC [31], looking for anomalies in the image leveraging
the EXIF metadata during the training phase, and Noiseprint
[29], which extracts and analyzes an image fingerprint where
camera model-related artifacts are emphasized. All these meth-
ods compute a heatmap representing the probability that a
1Contrary to other supervised methods, we were not able to re-train the
network on our data and used the original model in experiments.
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RESULTS OF ALL VERSIONS OF E2E AND ALL REFERENCES METHODS ON THE TEST DATASETS.
Method supervision Dresden/FAU DSO-1 Korus NC2017 MFC2018 MFC2019 average
Xception-resize weak 0.609 0.539 0.527 0.513 0.570 0.516 0.546
Xception-patchwise strong 0˚.721 0.643 0.533 0.729 0˚.711 0.632 0.661
CFA [2] – 0.507 0.584 0˚.598 0.593 0.539 0.526 0.558
DCT [3] – 0.505 0.614 0.501 0.683 0.523 0.509 0.556
NOI [1] – 0.558 0.543 0.507 0.678 0.523 0˚.726 0.589
NoisePrint [29] – 0.611 0˚.821 0.583 0.746 0.684 0.662 0˚.684
EXIF-SC [31] – 0.599 0.721 0.496 0.709 0.670 0.655 0.642
SPAM+SVM [8] weak 0.506 0.768 0.502 0.767 0.631 0.634 0.635
CNN+SVM [16] strong 0.593 0.728 0.568 0˚.798 0.702 0.679 0.678
LSTM-EnDec [25] strong 0.543 0.590 0.521 0.504 0.535 0.542 0.539
E2E-RGB weak 0.958 0.596 0.607 0.774 0.760 0.737 0.739
E2E-NP weak 0.874 0.924
¯
0.665
¯
0.766 0.776 0.741 0.791
E2E-RGB+NP weak 0.914 0.790 0.619 0.762 0.765 0.765 0.769
E2E-Fusion weak 0.993
¯
0.824 0.655 0.846
¯
0.838
¯
0.787
¯
0.824
¯
Fig. 7. Examples from the NIST datasets.
certain patch has been manipulated. To make the image-level
decision we extract several statistics from such heatmaps:
mean, maximum, and q-quantile, with q ∈ {5, 10, . . . , 95},
selecting the best one in terms of AUC performance separately
for each method. Note that all these latter methods are blind,
that is, they require no training on forged images or patches.
2) Datasets: for performance assessment, besides our syn-
thetic Dresden/FAU dataset, we consider several more datasets,
widely used in the forensics community, with markedly dif-
ferent characteristics. DSO-1 [40] features only splicings, with
little or no post-processing. In Korus [41], instead, both splic-
ings and copy-moves are present. Both datasets include only
large-size high-quality images, not even compressed in the
case of Korus. A very different, and much more challenging,
scenario is given by the NC2017, MFC2018, and the very
recent MFC2019 datasets [42], developed by NIST2 in the
context of the Medifor initiative. Images of these datasets
have been manually doctored, often with multiple and possibly
overlapping manipulations of various types. In addition, they
2https://www.nist.gov/itl/iad/mig/media-forensics-challenge-2019-0
have wildly different sizes and quality levels, and have been
subject to several anti-forensics measures to prevent easy
detection and localization of forgeries. For our tests, we kept
all images with splicing, copy-move, inpainting, or computer-
generated material. The reader is referred to Tab.I and to the
original papers for more details, while some example images
are shown in Fig.7
3) Numerical results: in Tab.IV we report the detection
AUC for all reference and proposed methods on all test
datasets. Next to each method, in column 2, we give the level
of supervision it requires, strong (pixel-wise ground truth),
weak (only image label), or – (none) for blind methods. In
the upper part of the table we group all reference methods,
including our two baselines, and in the lower part all version
of the proposed method with end-to-end (E2E) training. Best
results are highlighted in red for reference methods and in
blue for our proposal. In Fig.8 we also show ROC curves for
a subset of methods (for readability) and datasets (for space)
characterized by very different features. On the Dresden/FAU
dataset, disjoint from the training Vision/UCID dataset, but
well-aligned with it, the proposed method (E2E-RGB+NP)
largely outperforms all references, with a gain of almost
20 percent points over the best one, the strongly supervised
Xception-patchwise. Guided by the outcomes of preliminary
experiments, together with the “best” version, with RGB+NP
input, we consider also the versions with only RGB and
only NP inputs. To our surprise, E2E-RGB provides a further
significant performance improvement. Our explanation for this
phenomenon is the strong eterogeneity of the input: since
RGB bands and noiseprints have quite different statistics,
the net may have a hard time processing them jointly. To
confirm such hypothesis, we considered a further versions of
the proposed method, where the networks trained on RGB-
only, NP-only, and RGB+NP inputs are fused afterwards by
a trivial average of scores. This strategy proved successful,
with the new version, E2E-Fusion, providing almost perfect
detection (see also the top-left ROC in Fig.8), thus confirming
our conjecture.
Moving to the DSO-1 dataset, we observe again a large
9Fig. 8. ROC curves on Dresden/FAU (top-left), NC2017, MFC2018, MFC2019 (bottom-right) datasets. For the sake of clarity, ROCs are shown only for
selected methods: the best proposed (E2E-Fusion), the two baselines, and the best references (SPAM+SVM, CNN+SVM, Noiseprint, EXIF-SC). Only for
Dresden/FAU we also show other E2E versions. E2E-Fusion is always clearly, and almost uniformly, the best. The resizing-based baseline always the worst.
gain, more than 10 percent points, of the best E2E method
over the best reference. On this dataset, Noiseprint provides an
especially good performance. a phenomenon already observed
in [29], and likely related to all images being JPEG com-
pressed at high-quality. Accordingly, also E2E works best with
only noiseprints as input, with no fusion. Images of the Korus
dataset, instead, are uncompressed. This removes a major
source of forensic traces, which impacts all methods, some
of which exhibit a 0.5 AUC, equivalent to coin tossing. CFA
(relying on color filter array properties) and Noiseprint, keep
providing decent results, however they trail all E2E versions,
featuring AUC’s between 0.60 and 0.66.
Turning to the more challenging NIST datasets, the general
behavior does not change, with E2E working generally better
than reference methods. The best reference method is not
always the same for all such datasets: CNN+SVM for NC2017,
Xception-patchwise for MFC2018, NOI for MFC2019. On the
contrary, E2E-Fusion is always the best version of proposed
method, and the best overall, with a significant performance
gain over the best reference, going from 0.048 (NC2017) to
0.127 (MFC2018).
The final column shows the average over all datasets, which
confirms all above observations. We only underline, in passing,
that the Xception-resize baseline, as expected, performs quite
poorly due to the loss of precious high-frequency details, while
the Xception-patchwise baseline is among the best references,
although it is fair to recall that it requires strong supervision.
A general observation is that the performance of E2E is
consistently good in all cases (with a small dip on Korus),
including the NIST datasets, despite their great variety and
the abundance of counter-forensic measures. This is all the
more remarkable, considering that the network was trained on
a dataset, Vision/UCID, lacking such a diversity. Therefore, we
carried out a further experiment on NC2017 and MFC2018,
in which the E2E methods are fine-tuned on their respective
development sets, provided by NIST together with the test sets.
Results are reported in Tab.V and Tab.VI, while Fig.9 shows
the corresponding ROC curves. It is clear that fine-tuning on
the development set, certainly more aligned with the test set
than Vision/UCID, grants further performance gains. Over the
whole dataset (“all” column) the best AUC, obtained always
with E2E-Fusion, grows from 0.846 to 0.932 on NC2017, and
from 0.838 to 0.902 on MFC2018. The larger improvement on
NC2017 can be attributed to better development-test alignment
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TABLE V
RESULTS OF E2E METHODS ON NC2017 W/O AND WITH FINETUNING.
Method f.t. all splicing CM inpaint. CG
E2E-RGB 0.774 0.829 0.819 0.694 0˚.949
E2E-NP 0.765 0.774 0.752 0.762 0.902
E2E-RGB+NP n 0.762 0.816 0.832 0.693 0.921
E2E-Fusion 0˚.846 0˚.860 0˚.870 0˚.809 0.932
E2E-RGB 0.868 0.871 0.887 0.833 0.937
¯
E2E-NP 0.879 0.799 0.849 0.914 0.880
E2E-RGB+NP y 0.913 0.837 0.893 0.939 0.885
E2E-Fusion 0.932
¯
0.884
¯
0.911
¯
0.950
¯
0.935
TABLE VI
RESULTS OF E2E METHODS ON MFC2018 W/O AND WITH FINETUNING.
Method f.t. all splicing CM inpaint. CG
E2E-RGB 0.760 0.808 0.705 0.696 0.730
E2E-NP 0.775 0.805 0.750 0.744 0˚.817
E2E-RGB+NP n 0.765 0.795 0.733 0.734 0.786
E2E-Fusion 0˚.838 0˚.860 0˚.811 0˚.811 0.799
E2E-RGB 0.854 0.874 0.823 0.802 0.851
E2E-NP 0.844 0.868 0.819 0.811 0.864
E2E-RGB+NP y 0.867 0.893 0.842 0.824 0.874
E2E-Fusion 0.902
¯
0.925
¯
0.877
¯
0.856
¯
0.910
¯
and lighter counter-forensic actions. In any case, results are
extremely satisfactory for such challenging datasets.
In the tables, taking advantage of the auxiliary information
provided with these datasets, we also provide analytic results
for each type of forgery. Although E2E is trained only on splic-
ing, it works well also on all other localized manipulations.
The most interesting phenomenon we could spot from these
data is the performance drop on computer-generated fakes.
In NC2017 the AUC for these manipulations was very high,
above 0.93 without fine-tuning, lowering dramatically (0.80)
in MFC2018. Probably, this is the effect of the fast pace of
progress in the quality of such manipulations.
D. Towards forgery localization
The E2E framework was conceived and trained with the
goal of making global decisions, leaving the problem of
localization to other tools. However, just like localization
tools can be used for detection through suitable fusion, the
proposed detection framework can be recast to provide also
some localization information. In the following subsections
we provide some insight into how the system exploits and
combines local information coming from all over the image,
and how this can be exploited towards forgery localization.
1) Activation Maps: first of all, we try to investigate the
impact of each patch of the image on the final decision. To
this end, we consider a simplified framework in which only
the max pooling is used. Given this hard selection rule, we
can easily compute a spatial activation map which counts how
many features each patch contributes to the overall feature
vector. Such a map, however, would be extremely coarse,
due the low resolution of patch-wise analysis. Therefore, we
combine it with the a high-resolution map, the Grad-CAM
Fig. 9. ROC curves of all E2E variants on NC2017 (top) and MFC2018
(bottom) without (dashed lines) and with (solid) fine-tuning on the NIST
development sets. Fine-tuning provides a significant gain in all cases.
(guided gradient weighted class activation map) obtained by
backpropagating the loss gradient to the full-resolution input
[43]. In Fig.10 we show some results for images of the
Dresden/FAU dataset (hand-made to look more realistic). For
this synthetic dataset, we have the pristine version of each
manipulated image, so we can analyze the network behavior in
both circumstances. In all cases, the network focuses on high-
activity regions, often corresponding to object boundaries.
When there is no manipulation, the salient regions are scattered
all over the image. On the contrary, when a splicing takes
place, they tend to concentrate on the boundaries of the spliced
object, proving that the system has learned to look at these
patches to make its decisions. Therefore, when a forged image
is detected, this activation provides hints about the possible site
of the manipulation.
2) ROI-based Analysis: moving towards forgery localiza-
tion, we can obtain some interesting results by leveraging
the flexibility of the proposed framework. Indeed, since the
system can analyze images of any size, it can also analyze
regions of interest (ROI) selected by the user based on the
previous activation map or any other criterion. If the ROI
contains manipulated material, the system will likely provide
a large probability of manipulation (score, from now on).
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Fig. 10. Example images (top) and activation maps (bottom) from the Dresden/FAU dataset. Pristine images are on the odd columns, forged images (with
hand-made splicings for higher visibility) on the even columns. Active patches are superimposed in cyan to the gray-scale/red-scale version of the images.
Therefore, the system can be used in supervised modality
to test suspicious objects. Also, it can be recast to perform
automatic box-like localization. In fact, once features have
been computed and stored for all patches, the aggregation and
classification phases are extremely simple, with light-speed
processing. Therefore, one can easily test a large number of
boxes and select automatically as ROI those with the largest
scores, obtaining a rough but effective form of localization.
Fig.11 shows some examples taken from the MFC2018
dataset. Together with the original images (top) and activations
maps (middle) it also shows (bottom) the scores obtained over
the whole image (white number in the top-left corner) and on
selected boxes (colored numbers). The green boxes have been
selected manually around possible subjects of interest, while
the magenta boxes are selected by our automatic procedure
around the local maxima of the score. In the first image, the
man on the right has been spliced on the host background.
Here, the activation map provides strong hints on the possible
manipulation, confirmed by a large image-level score (0.935).
However, an even larger score (1.000) is obtained when a
ROI is correctly placed around the splicing. The automatic
procedure also selects a ROI roughly covering the splicing,
with unitary score. Another ROI is selected automatically in
a pristine area in correspondence of a local maximum, but is
has a rather low score (0.428). In the second image, a further
splicing has been added, the woman in the center. Neither
the activation map nor the automatic ROI selection procedure
highlight this new subject. So, we selected a ROI manually
around this splicing, obtaining a rather low score. Exploiting
the side information provided with the NIST datasets, we
investigated on this splicing, to discover that the inserted
object had been acquired with the same camera model as the
host image. This fact reduces the discriminating power of the
noiseprint input, justifying in hindsight such result. In the third
image, the only manipulation is a tiny inpainted region. Here,
a supervised selection makes no sense, since the manipulated
region does not correspond to any semantic object. However,
the manipulation is nicely localized through the automatic
procedure, with unitary score, unlike other candidate ROIs
characterized by low scores. The last image shows an opposite
case, with many large, semantically relevant, objects spliced
on the host image. To avoid cluttering the image, we now
show only the supervised ROIs and the corresponding scores,
which are very large in all cases.
To complete this visual inspection of results, it is fair to
show, in Fig.12, some counter-examples where the proposed
framework fails to detect the manipulation. Reasons for failure
are not always obvious. In these cases, they may be related
to the absence of texture in the spliced object (right) or
the strongly textured host image (right) which may hide the
discriminating information. Note that in the image on the
right, a well-placed ROI would allow detection, but there is
no semantic hint to select it.
V. CONCLUSION
We proposed a new CNN-based framework for image
forgery detection. Thanks to suitable architectural solutions,
it allows one to process jointly information gathered at full-
resolution from the whole image. Moreover, the framework
can be trained end-to-end based only on weak (image-level)
supervision. We proved the effectiveness of this solution by ex-
tensive performance analysis on forensic datasets widespread
in the community. A large performance gain is observed in
all cases with respect to all reference methods. In addition,
the framework can be also recast to provide localization
information, both in supervised and unsupervised modality.
Despite the very promising results, there is still much room
for improvement. In particular, better forms of pooling should
be considered to preserve long-range spatial relationships in
the aggregation phase. Moreover, image and object semantics
should be taken into account to complement the low-level
information analyzed by the current framework. Work is
already under way along these paths.
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